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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
message previously quoted,60 while asserting the morality of the proper
activities of labor unions, was directed at monopolistic tendencies on
the part of particular labor organizations. It would seem that prac-
tices presently engaged in by certain American labor unions come
within this classification. 61 The right-to-work type of statute merits
consideration as a step toward the elimination of abuses which are
engendered by union-security agreements. 62 In addition, it represents
a wholesome return to state control over labor relations, albeit this
power is embodied in a retractable grant from Congress. As to the
latter point, it is imperative that federal and state legislators should
begin to envision the feasibility of a constitutional amendment which
will insure that state legislation in the field of labor relations cannot
be nullified by Congress. In the meanwhile, it is to be hoped that
the New York State Legislature will take under advisement the ques-
tion of whether or not a right-to-work law is desirable for the pro-
tection of non-union workers in this state.
M
THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL-ITS AUTHORIZATION,
OPERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Introduction
Although the legal profession has admirably served the public
on the national and state levels of government,' the recent Survey
60 See p. 263 supra.
61 Thus, the Motion Picture Machine Operators frequently admit only sons
or close relatives of members; the Brewers exclude new members unless jobs
are available; and the Locomotive Firemen and the Boilermakers discriminate
against negroes. See Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MIcn.
L. REv. 805, 821 (1951). Some unions have the power to expel members for
reasons not connected with union activity. See Summers, Disciplinary Powers
of Unions, 3 IND. & L. REL. REv. 483, 492-493 (1950). In industries where
union-security contracts predominate, expulsion may bar a worker from his
trade. See Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & L. REL.
REv. 15, 28 (1950).
62 See, e.g., Lawrence, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 4, 1955, p. 15, col. 1,
wherein the author relates the recent action of a union leader in Pennsylvania
who threatened 2,900 members with unemployment unless they registered to
vote in a public election. If Pennsylvania had a right-to-work law, no such
incident could have occurred.
I See BLAUSTEIN AND PORTER WITH DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN LAWYER
97-103 (1954).
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of the Legal Profession has indicated that lawyers are remiss in their
duty to participate in municipal affairs.2 It would seem that if lawyers
are to be more active in this field, knowledge of our municipal gov-
ernment is a prerequisite.3 Accordingly, the subject of this note, the
legislature of New York City, the City Council, and its authorization,
structure, legislative machinery, powers and accomplishments, is of
particular importance.
A city, or municipal corporation, has been defined as "... a pub-
lic institution, a political organ, designed to promote the common
interests of the inhabitants in their organized capacity as a local
government." 4 Professor Dillon has described a city as ". . . the
incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants
of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corpo-
rate capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation
and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns." 5
In short, the feature of a municipal corporation which distinguishes
it from other corporate forms is its power to govern. In this con-
nection, it is appropriate to emphasize that a city is not itself con-
sidered to be sovereign, but rather, it exists only by a specific grant
from the sovereign.6 Like other corporations, however, a city's au-
thority, powers and limitations are found in the charter granted by
the state and in the state's constitution and statutes. 7
2 See Seasongood, Public Service by Lawyers inr Local Government,
2 SYAcusE L. REV. 210 (1951).
3 Seasongood criticizes "[flaw school deans, faculties and their committees
on curriculum . . ." for not treating municipal law as a proper subject for
instruction. Id. at 215. As indicative of the importance of this field he points
out that in 1940 ". . . one case out of seven argued in the New York Court
of Appeals and in the Appellate Division of the First Department was a city
case." Id. at 215 n.12. It has been stated that there are more than 550 lawyers
employed in the Department of Law of the Corporation Counsel of New York
City and that there are numerous opportunities in the field for law school
graduates. Id. at 215.
4 1 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR'ORATIONS 383 (3d ed. 1949).
5 1 DxuON, MUNICIPAL COPOnRATIONS § 32(20) (5th ed. 1911).
6 See City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 437, 165
N.E. 836, 838 (1929) ; Cuddon v. Eastwick, 1 Salk. 192, 193, 91 Eng. Rep. 174
(KB. 1704) semble.
7 For a thorough discussion of the constitutional and statutory provisions,
see McGoLDrlcK, LAW AND PACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HomE Rui (1916-1930)
263-289 (1933); 11 NEW YoRK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION Com-
MITrEE, PROBLEMtS RELATING TO HOME RULE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 18-34
(1938); PRASHKEt, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§§ 16-28 (1927) ; Asch, Municipal Honw Rule in New York, 20 BRooKLYN L.
REv. 201 (1954); McBain, The New York Proposal for Municipal Home Rule,
37 Pol. ScI. Q. 655 (1922); Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New
York, 54 COL. L. REv. 311 (1954); Weiner, Municipal Home Rule in New
York, 37 COL. L. REV. 557 (1937).
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Constitutional and Statutory Considerations
Adopted in 1923, Article IX of the New York State Constitution
contains the provisions applicable to local legislation in New York.
Section 9 8 of that article provides that the state legislature has the
duty to organize cities in such a way as to enable them to exercise
the powers which have been granted to them. Section 11 9 bars the
legislature from passing special or local legislation which relates in
terms and in effect to the "property, affairs or government" of any
city. The state may intrude into that sphere only by the passage of
general laws. However, if the mayor and the local legislative body
of any city declare that a need exists, the state legislature may, by
a two-thirds vote of both houses, enact the requested special
legislation.' 0
The area within which cities are permitted to legislate is defined
by Section 12,11 which along with Section 11 is the constitutional basis
of home rule. Under the former section, cities possess the "... power
to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the constitution
and laws of the state relating to [their] . . . property, affairs or
government." In addition, cities may adopt and amend laws relating
to certain enumerated subjects not within their "property, affairs or
government." 12
The City Home Rule Law, 13 enacted in 1924, implements the
constitutional provisions outlined above and provides the machinery
for city government. Under this statute, the City Council may adopt
and amend local laws in relation to the "property, affairs or govern-
ment" of the city. As in the Constitution, there is a list of the areas
in which the city may legislate, whether or not such legislation relates
to the "property, affairs or government" of the city.' 4  If the local
law is not within the scope of that phrase, however, or if it is not
otherwise authorized, the Council can not override an enactment by
sN.Y. CoNsT. Art. IX, § 9.
9Id. §11.
'
0 Ibid. It is also provided that the local legislative body alone, by a two-
thirds vote, may request the state to enact special legislation. Ibid.
II Id. § 12.
12 A law may be without the "property, affairs or government" of a city if
it relates to: (1) the officers and employees of the city; (2) the local legisla-
tive body; (3) the business, obligations or claims of a city; (4) the streets
and property of a city; (5) the collection and administration of local taxes
authorized by the state legislature; (6) the wages, hours, and welfare of persons
employed by contractors doing business with the city; (7) the government and
regulation of the conduct of its inhabitants; (8) the protection of its inhabi-
tants' property, safety and health. Ibid.
13 Laws of N.Y. 1924, c. 363, as amended, Laws of N.Y. 1939, c. 867.
'
4 N.Y. CiTy Ho E RulE LAw § 11(1) (b).
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the state.15 Moreover, the Council is authorized to delegate to city
officials the power of carrying any local law into effect, and it may
provide for the enforcement of local laws by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings.' To enforce these laws, the Council may in addition make
their violation punishable as misdemeanors."7 Mandatory procedural
requirements for the passage of a local law are enumerated in the City
Home Rule Law.' 8 In addition, requirements are prescribed for the
veto of a local law by the Mayor 19 and the overriding of such veto by
the local legislative body; 2 0 for a mandatory referendum when cer-
tain types of local laws are passed; 21 for a referendum on petition of
a certain number of qualified electors; 22 for the procedure involved
in amending a city's charter; 23 and, for adoption of a new charter
by the local legislative body.2 4 It is also explicitly provided that the
Home Rule Law is to be construed liberally.2 5
New York City Council
Pursuant to the New York City Charter Revision Commission
Act of 1934,26 a commission was authorized to ". . . make a study
and analysis of the existing governmental structure of the city of New
York... [and was] directed to draft a proposed new charter, adapted
to the requirements of such city and designed to provide for the people
of such city a more efficient and economical form of government." 2T
The findings of the commission indicated that the Board of Aldermen,
established under the Greater New York City Charter of 1897, had
come to be widely criticized as a large, unwieldy body whose func-
tions were confused between those that were legislative and those that
were administrative.28  It was to cure these defects that the Council
was established. 29
is Id. § 11(2).
16Id. § 11(3) (a), (b).
1 7 Id. § 11(3) (b).
28 Id. § 13.
19 Id. § 14.
20 Ibid.
21 Id. § 15.
22 Id. §§ 16, 17.
23 Id. §19-a.
24 Id. §20.
25 Id. §31.
26 Laws of N.Y. 1934, c. 867, as amended, Laws of N.Y. 1935, c. 292.
27Id. §3.
28 See Report of the New York City Charter Revision Commission in
TANZER, THE NEW YORK Crry CHAnrm 473, 487 (1937) ; SHAW, THE HISTORY
OF THE NEw YORK CiTy L. IS ArTuRE 229 et seq. (1954) passim.
29 See TANZER, op. cit. supra note 28, at 487. In addition, the Charter was
designed, inter alia, to enlarge the home rule powers of the city. Id. at 516-517.
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Pursuant to the approval expressed by the city's electorate on
November 3, 1936,30 a new Charter went into effect on January 1,
1938. A smaller, more efficient body of twenty-five councilmen,
each elected from one of the city's senatorial districts,3' replaced the
sixty-five aldermen who had represented much smaller areas. Under
this Charter the President of the Council is elected from the city at
large for a four-year term.3 2 He presides over the meetings of the
Council and takes part in general discussions of bills, but he does not
have the right to vote except in cases of a tie.38 In addition to his
duties in the Council, the President also sits on the Board of Estimate,
the administrative body of the city.34 Furthermore, when the Mayor is
absent because of sickness, suspension from office by the Governor,3 5
or for any other reason, the President of the Council acts in his
stead.3 6 In organizing their legislative machinery at the beginning
of each session, the councilmen elect one of their number to serve as
a Vice-Chairman, who performs the duties of the President when the
latter is absent; but if the Vice-Chairman is called upon to act in this
capacity, his right to vote upon matters before the Council is re-
tained.3 7 Rules of procedure are also adopted 3 and standing com-
mittees organized 89 at the start of each session.
30 The result of the referendum on acceptance of the Charter was 952,519 in
favor of the Charter and 603,072 against it. For a further breakdown of the
vote by counties and assembly districts, see TANZER, op. cit. supra note 28, at
9-11.
31 Section 22 of the New York City Charter, approved by the electorate in a
referendum on November 4, 1947, replaced the method of electing councilmen
by proportional representation. The proportional representation method pro-
vided for borough-wide elections, each borough electing one councilman for every
75,000 votes cast. This method was adopted, originally, by a vote of 923,186
to 555,217, at the same time that the Charter was accepted. For a breakdown
of the vote, see TANZER, op. cit. supra note 28, at 12-14. See Note, 11 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 87 (1936).32 N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 23 and 3. Originally, it was provided that the
councilmen were to be elected for two-year terms but this was extended to four
years by amendment. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 24, as amended, Local Laws
of New York City, 1945, No. 32.
3 3 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 29.
34 Id. § 61. See Report of the New York City Charter Revision Commission
in TANZER, THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 488-489 (1937).
35 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 8. The Governor may also remove the President
of the Council. Id. § 23(b).36 Id. § 10.
37Id. §29.
38 See MANTuAi OF THE COUNCIL (1954). If a matter arises for which the
Council has not provided any procedure, Reed's Rules govern. Id. at 11.
39 All committees are appointed by the standing committee on Rules, Privi-
leges and Elections. There are twelve standing committees: Buildings; City
Affairs; Civil Employees and Veterans; Codification; Finance; General Wel-
fare; Health and Education; Housing; Labor and Industry; Parks and Thor-
oughfares; Rules, Privileges and Elections; and State Legislation. Id. at 8.
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Sole power to enact local laws belongs to the Council.40 In
legislating, the procedure of the Council is not unlike that of Congress.
Every proposed local law which is introduced must be sponsored by
a councilman. 41  In instances where the bill is recommended by the
Mayor, it is generally sponsored by the councilman who is the senior
leader of the same political party. After its introduction, the bill
is sent to one of the standing committees. If the bill is outside the
area within which any of the committees operate, the standing Com-
mittee on Rules, Privileges and Elections has the power to establish
a special committee to investigate the proposition.4 2 After holding
hearings and investigating the bill, the Committee may meet in an
executive session at which time the members discuss and vote upon
the proposition. If the proposed law is reported out of the committee
favorably, it may be debated and approved by the Council at a regular
meeting of the entire body. A majority vote of all the councilmen is
required to pass local laws.43 After passage, the proposed local law
is presented to the Mayor for his approval. 44 Within ten days after
receiving the bill, the Mayor must give five days notice for a public
hearing which is required to be held before he may sign the bill.45
Thereafter, the Mayor may sign and return it to the clerk of the
Council-it is from that time deemed to be adopted. 46 The bill may
40 N.Y. CITY CHAra § 21.
41 See MANUAL OF THE COUNCIL 6 (1954).
42 1d. at 8. In investigating the bill it is important to note that the Council
has the power of subpoena. N.Y. CITY CHARTa § 43. It can also direct the
New York City Department of Investigation to conduct an inquiry. Id. § 803.
It has been held that since a city is not composed of co-ordinate independent
branches of government, the Mayor is subject to the Council's power of sub-
poena. Matter of LaGuardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (1942).
Even though the state legislature has set up a complete system for adminis-
tering the Civil Service, the Council has power to investigate its operations
with the end of removing the Commissioner for misfeasance. This is so because
the health, safety and welfare of civil service employees is properly within the
"property, affairs or government" of the city. See Matter of Smith v. Kern,
175 Misc. 937, 26 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inern., 260 App. Div. 1003,
24 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd mem., 285 N.Y. 632, 33 N.E.2d 556
(1941). The Council has power to investigate even though the executive de-
partment of the city is conducting an inquiry; moreover, the Council may
subpoena the other investigators. See Matter of Herlands v. Surpless, 258
App. Div. 275, 16 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1st Dep't 1939), aff'd nmern., 282 N.Y. 647,
26 N.E.2d 800 (1940); cf. Matter of Radio Station WNYC (Novik), 169
Misc. 502, 504, 7 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 255 App. Div. 844,
7 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd nmem., 280 N.Y. 629, 20 N.E.2d 1008
(1939). However, it has been held that Section 352 of the Civil Practice Act
prevented the Council from compelling privileged testimony from the medical
director of a city hospital which was being investigated. Matter of New York
City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
43 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 34.44 Id. § 38 (a).
4 Id. § 38 (b).
46 Id. § 38(c).
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also become law if the Mayor does not take any action within thirty
days after he has held the hearing.47 However, if the Mayor dis-
approves of the bill he may return it to the clerk of the Council along
with his objections.48  Within thirty days after receiving the Mayor's
veto, the Council by a two-thirds vote may re-enact the bill and it is
then considered adopted. 49
In addition, certain local laws must also be approved by the
Board of Estimate.50 The Board must approve a bill before it is sent
to the Mayor if it has for its objective the amendment or repeal of
any provision of the Charter or if it envisions ". . . transferring or
changing the powers and duties of, or conferring powers or duties
upon, or prescribing the qualifications, number, mode of selection or
removal, terms of office or compensation of officers or employees of
the city or of any agency, or reducing or repealing taxes, fees or
charges receivable by the city or interest or penalties thereon . .,, 51
If the proposed law is designed to make any substantial changes, enu-
merated in the Charter, which relate to the structure of the city gov-
ernment, it must be approved by a referendum.52
It would seem from a reading of the constitutional, statutory and
charter provisions that New York City is equipped for effective law-
making. However, during the seventeen years of its existence, the
Council, although a great expense to the taxpayers, has failed to
assume its proper position as the legislature of the nation's largest
city. Local legislation has cost $7,298,476.27 during this time. 3 For
this amount of money the city has received in return 1,837 local laws.
Of this total, 540 enactments dealt with changing the names of streets,
parks, and playgrounds. Four hundred and forty-two of the statutes
related to the Department of Housing and Buildings-most of them
affecting the Building Code. Transference, assignment, or disposal
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Id. § 39.
5' Ibid.
52 Id. § 40.
5 3 The following figures, from the various city budgets, indicate the total
allocations for the Council, the President of the Council and the City Clerk
(who is under the control of the Council pursuant to Section 31 of the City
Charter): 1938 ($467,690); 1939, Jan. 1 to June 30 ($233,845); 1939-1940
($336,106); 1940-1941 ($322,914.82); 1941-1942 ($343,044.83); 1942-1943
($342,012.82); 1943-1944 ($314,854); 1944-1945 ($294,834.80); 1945-1946
($317,465) ; 1946-1947 ($346,455) ; 1947-1948 ($393,185) ; 1948-1949 ($414,190) ;
1949-1950 ($450,515) ; 1950-1951 ($518,310); 1951-1952 ($537,253); 1952-1953
($534,697); 1953-1954 ($564,761); 1954-1955 ($566,343). Councilmen are paid
seven thousand dollars a year, and the President of the Council's yearly salary
is twenty-five thousand dollars. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 25, as amended, Local
Laws of New York City, 1949, No. 107.
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of city real property was the concern of 256 laws, and 117 dealt with
taxation. Thus, at least 1,355 local laws out of the total of 1,837
have involved matters of minor importance.54 The cause of this fail-
ure does not lie with the established legislative machinery. Rather,
the New York courts have so extended the area within which the
state may legislate, while at the same time limiting the scope of the
city's power, that it has become impossible for the Council to enact
more than insignificant legislation.
Judicial Restrictions
The first case to arise under the Home Rule Amendment to the
Constitution and the City Home Rule Law was Browne v. City of
New York.m5 In that case, involving the acquisition and operation of
a municipal bus system, the New York Court of Appeals held that,
under the facts presented, New York City could not legally enter into
the business of a common carrier. The court, however, reaffirmed an
earlier view that transportation is a legitimate interest of a munici-
pality. 6 Refusing to go further than was necessary for the decision,
54 By the use of the phrase "minor importance" it is not intended to mini-
mize the value of some of the legislation which has been passed by the Council.
For example, there seems to be no doubt as to the necessity of the laws which
pertain to the Building Code. However, the technical nature of these enact-
ments, which relate to processes and materials of construction, makes it obvious
that they are not the work of councilmen, but rather, of experts em-
ployed by the Department of Housing and Buildings. Why it is necessary to
have the legislature "rubber stamp" what could just as easily (and probably
more inexpensively) be promulgated by an administrative board, is difficult to
comprehend. Again, enactments relating to taxation are considered of minor
importance only because, as the state-city relationship now stands, the city can
tax only within the areas, and to the extent, that the state permits. The Court
of Appeals has said that, "[tihe power of taxation, being a State function, the
delegation of any part of that power to a subdivision of the State must be made
in express terms." County Securities, Inc. v. Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34, 37, 15
N.E.2d 179, 180 (1938). See, e.g., New York Steam Corp. v. City of New
York, 263 N.Y. 137, 197 N.E. 172 (1935). The state could enact the same
laws as it does now, and empower a local tax collector to accept the returns
and turn over the funds which have been appropriated by the Board of Esti-
mate to the various departments of the city. Also, after the main body
of a tax law has been passed, the acts relating to it are either re-enactments
or minor amendments. Thus the tax laws are considered to be of minor
importance. The laws which concern themselves with "changing names"
are patently trivial. Again, the local laws which relate to the transference of
city-owned realty from one department of the city government to another,
although necessary, obviously do not call for the existence of elaborate legis-
lative machinery. See Appendix.
, 241 N.Y. 96, 149 N.E. 211 (1925). See PRASHKER, OUTLINES OF THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL. CORPORATIONS § 24 (1927).
56 See Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 110, 99 N.E.
241 (1912); Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. The Mayor, 152 N.Y. 257,
46 N.E. 499 (1897).
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the court did not delineate the respective areas of state and local con-
trol. Thus it was effectively emphasized that the right of a city to
legislate for itself was within ". . a field of operation, narrower than
some of the friends of the principle of home rule would favor. . . ." 57
In 1927, however, the proponents of home rule were encouraged
when an act of the legislature 58 was stricken down by the Court of
Appeals as being "special" in that it affected the "property, affairs or
government" of New York City.59 The disputed enactment was
drawn so as only to provide relief for a specific plaintiff who had been
defeated the previous year in an action against the city. Although
the act was "general" in its terms, which would have been sufficient
to sustain its constitutionality under the provisions of the Constitu-
tion of 1894,60 it was "special" in effect, and thus invalid under the
test laid down by the 1923 Amendment. The court said that:
* * * the principle of division, considered merely for the purpose of a working
approximation, may be stated to be this: If the class in its formation is so
unnatural and wayward that only by the rarest coincidence can the range of its
extension include more than one locality, and at best but two or three, the act
so hedged and circumscribed is local in effect. If the same limits are apparent
upon the face of the act, unaided by extrinsic evidence, or are so notorious or
obvious as to be the subject of judicial notice, it is also local in its terms.61
Nevertheless, this decision did not alter the court's attitude, as ex-
pressed in the Browne case, concerning the limited sphere in which a
city may legislate. Consequently, an act of the legislature changing
the boundary lines of the city,62 as they had been established in the
Greater New York City Charter of 1897, was upheld in a suit by the
city to enjoin its enforcement. In this case, City of New York v.
Village of Lawrence,6 the court reasoned that the powers of the
legislature were limited by the Amendment of 1923 only by the
phrase "property, affairs or government," and that outside of that
area its powers were not affected. 64 Finding that there was ". . . no
case where the words 'relating to the property, affairs or government
of cities' . . . [had] been held to include legislation which does not
deal directly with the internal affairs of a city or the functions of its
57 Browne v. City of New York, 241 N.Y. 96, 125, 149 N.E. 211, 220
(1925).
58 Laws of N.Y. 1925, c. 602.
59 Matter of Mayor of New York (Elm Street), 246 N.Y. 72, 158 N.E. 24
(1927).60 Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E. 187
(1922).
61 Matter of Mayor of New York (Elm Street), supra note 59 at 78-79,
158 N.E. at 26.
62 Laws of N.Y. 1928, c. 802.
63250 N.Y. 429, 165 N.E. 836 (1929).
64 Id. at 440, 165 N.E. at 839.
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officers, and which affects the welfare of the general public as well as
the residents of a city or cities," 65 the court stated that if the city had
attempted to change its boundaries, such action would be without the
sphere in which it was empowered to legislate. Thus, if the power
did not belong to the city, the court concluded it must of necessity
reside in the state.
The judicial attitude that a municipality is subservient to state
power again manifested itself in the leading case of Adler v. Deegan.66
In that case it was contended that the Multiple Dwelling Law 67 was
unconstitutional on the ground that it was special legislation not passed
by two-thirds of the legislature pursuant to an emergency message
by the Governor.68 Judge Crane, writing for the majority, conceded
that a colloquial interpretation of "property, affairs or government"
would render the law unconstitutional. However, after reviewing
past decisions, he concluded that the phrase had become words of art
comparable to "carelessness, negligence, fraud or theft" and as such
had acquired a limited legal meaning.69 He indicated that since it is
within the police power of the state to provide for the health of the
people of the state, and that since housing conditions of the city affect
the health of the state as a whole, the Multiple Dwelling Law was
constitutional. In a concurring opinion, Judge Pound expressed the
thought that this statute was not special since the state may make a
reasonable classification based upon population in order to provide
for the "life, health and safety" of the inhabitants of the city.70 Chief
Judge Cardozo, in concurring, said that his reason for sustaining the
statute went beyond the area of public health. Rather, Cardozo rested
his opinion on the argument that slum areas destroyed the moral and
physical attributes of the people of the state, and that it was within
the province of the state to alleviate such conditions. 71 Attempting
to define the respective areas of state and local legislative powers, he
stated that subjects ". . . not affecting the welfare of the inhabitants
of the city qua inhabitants thereof . . ." are not properly within the
city's regulatory power.72
65 Id. at 443, 165 N.E. at 840.
68251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929).
67 Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 713.68 This was the procedure for enacting special legislation prior to 1938.
See 11 NEw YoRx STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVRKTIoN CommiarrE, PROBLEMS
RELATING To HOME RULE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT 22 (1938).
69 "When the people put these words in... the Constitution, they put them
there with a Court of Appeals' definition, not that of Webster's Dictionary."
Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 473, 167 N.E. 705, 707 (1929).
70 Id. at 483, 167 N.E. at 710.
71 Id. at 484, 167 N.E. at 711.
72 Id. at 489, 167 N.E. at 713.
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Another case which tended to centralize authority in the legis-
lature was Robertson v. Zimmerntnn.73 There, the statute in ques-
tion provided for the transfer of control of the sewerage system from
the City of Buffalo to the Buffalo Sewer Authority, an administrative
board to be set up by the Mayor of that city.74 Since Buffalo, because
of its debt limitation, could not comply with an order of the State
Commissioner of Health to protect the natural waters around the city
from pollution, an act was passed by the state legislature creating the
Authority. In a taxpayer's action, which was brought to restrain the
Mayor from appointing members to the Authority, the issue presented
was whether the enactment related to the "property, affairs or gov-
ernment" of the city, in which case it would be unconstitutional. It
was also contended that the statute was special legislation not passed
pursuant to the constitutional provisions therefor. Employing the
rationale of Adler v. Deegan, the court stated that "[a] n act designed
to remedy conditions affecting the public generally, though imposing
restrictions or obligations upon a particular municipality as a means
of affecting the larger purpose can hardly be said to be local in its
effect." 75 Thus, the state-created Authority was recognized as a
means by which the legislature could interfere in areas within which
only cities are constitutionally authorized to act.76
Conclusion
As a result of these cases, the city's power to legislate has been
severely restricted. 77 In addition, the constitutional protection given
to cities against state interference with matters of local concern has
been considerably weakened. Since city enactments of any impor-
73268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935).74 Laws of N.Y. 1935, c. 349.
75 Robertson v. Zimmermann, supra note 73 at 59, 196 N.E. at 742.
76 More recently, the City of New York was forced to allow the New York
City Transit Authority to take over the operation of the city's transportation
system. The pressure was applied by conditioning authorization of a needed
tax law upon acceptance of the Authority. See Laws of N.Y. 1953, cc. 200-208.
See Salzman v. Impellitteri, 305 N.Y. 414, 421, 113 N.E.2d 543, 544 (1953)
(dissenting opinion) (The court held in this case that since the statutes were
only permissive in an area of state interest, they were constitutional. The
city's right to enter into contracts with the Authority was thus sustained.). On
this problem see generally, 11 NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
COMITTE, PROBLEMS RELATING TO HomE RULE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENT 60
(1938) ; Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Somie Legal and Practical Aspects,
47 YALE L.J. 14, 19 et seq. (1937) ; Legis., Sonte Observations on the New York
City Transit Authority, 28 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 174, 179 (1953). An extensive
list of the Authorities which have been established in New York State can
be found in Gaynor v. Marohn, 268 N.Y. 417, 424, 198 N.E. 13, 15-16 (1935).
77 See, e.g., F.T.B. Realty Corp. v. Goodman, 300 N.Y. 140, 89 N.E.2d 865
(1949); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312, 49 N.F_.2d
153 (1943).
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tance will probably be stricken down by the courts, the Council gen-
erally relies upon the state legislature to pass statutes which the city
needs.78 Understandable then, is the paucity of legislation which
issues from the Council's chambers.
New York City's budget of 1.7 billion dollars is second only to
the Federal Government's 79 and exceeds those of many countries be-
longing to the United Nations, which it houses. With about 8,115,000
residents,8 0 it is the nation's most populated city. As such its prob-
lems are unique.8 ' The notion that state representatives from
Schoharie or Chenango Counties or other rural upstate areas can
understand the problems of the city, or legislate effectively to solve
them is unrealistic. To correct this unjustifiable situation a re-
evaluation of the constitutional provisions for home rule is imperative.
In 1957, the electorate of New York State will, by referendum, decide
whether a constitutional convention should be called the following
year to correct shortcomings in the present Constitution.82 The
phrase "property, affairs or government" must be replaced. Nothing
but a substitution which will give the Council greater power to legis-
late in a wider field will accomplish the desired goal of city home rule.
78 See ScHWARTZ, A STUDY OF TH E NEv YORK CITY COUNCIL 57-58 (Manu-
script on file with the New York City Municipal Reference Library, 1941).
7 See Interview with Mayor of New York City Robert F. Wagner, U.S.
News & World Report, March 11, 1955, p. 61, col. 1.
80 See 1955 Wo=' ALMANAC 238 (1953 estimate).
81 See New York City in Trotible, U.S. News & World Report, March 11,
1955, p. 48 et seq.
82 N.Y. CONST. Art. XIX, § 2.
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